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Summary findings
In recent years foreign  bank participation  has increased  whether bank origin affects the share and growth rate of
tremendously  in Latin America.  Some observers argue  bank lending to small businesses.  They find that although
that foreign bank entry will benefit Latin American  foreign banks generally  lent less to small businesses  (as
banking systems by reducing the volatility of loans and  share of total lending) than private domestic  banks,  the
deposits and increasing efficiency.  Others are concerned  difference  is due primarily to the behavior of small
that foreign banks might choose to extend credit only to  foreign banks. The  difference was  considerably smaller
certain customers,  leaving some sectors-such  as small  for large and medium-sized  banks. And in Chile and
businesses-unserved.  Colombia,  large foreign banks might actually lend
Clarke  and his coauthors  examine  this issue. Using  slightly more  (as share of total lending)  than large
bank-level data for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru  domestic banks.
during the mid-1990s,  they empirically investigate
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The increasing participation  of foreign banks  has been one of the most striking structural changes
experienced  by banking  systems  in  developing  countries  over the  past decade.  In Central  Europe  the
percentage of assets controlled  by foreign  banks increased  from 8 percent  in 1994 to  56 percent  in  1999.
As of December  2000, foreign  financial  institutions controlled  38 percent of loans in the major countries
of Latin  America,  up  from  15  percent  in  1996.  In Asia,  the numbers  are less  striking,  but the  trend  is
definitely visible.  Foreign control in this region  has increased from 2 to 13 percent.'
Whether foreign bank entry will be beneficial for developing countries  is an  issue of controversy.
Proponents  of this process  argue that  foreign banks  bring new  capital,  improve  management  expertise,
and  promote  efficient  and  competitive  banking  practices.  Also,  because  foreign  banks  have  access  to
alternative  sources  of funding other than local deposits,  many argue that foreign entry may  lead  to lower
volatility  and  higher  growth  of lending.  In  contrast,  those  opposing  opening  up  financial  systems  to
foreign ownership  argue that foreign banks  may decrease the stability of aggregate  domestic  bank credit
by facilitating  capital  flight during  crises and  simultaneously  increasing  countries'  exposure  to regional
contagion and to shocks in the home countries of foreign banks.
Another  common  argument  against  foreign  bank  entry  is that these  institutions  might tend  to
"cherry  pick"  the  most  profitable  customers,  reducing  financing  to  some  sectors,  increasing  the  risk
exposure of local  banks,  and thus, affecting the overall distribution  of credit. In  particular,  the main area
of concern  is the availability of credit to small businesses. In many developing countries, small businesses
account  for a very  significant share of total value added and  generate a large fraction of the total jobs in
the economy.  Banks  are perceived  as having a comparative  advantage  over other  lending  institutions  in
small  business  lending.  This  role  is  likely  to be  more  important  in  less  developed  countries  that are
generally  more  heavily  dependent  on  bank  financing.  In  Argentina,  for example,  79  percent  of small
industrial firms have bank debt (Llorens, van der Host, and Isusi,  1999).  Moreover,  small businesses tend
to  have  exclusive  dealings  with  a  single bank  with  which  they have  a strong  relationship.  Given  the
paucity of information  about small  businesses,  these relationships  enable  banks to generate  information
Ion  the  risk  characteristics  of  small  firns.  Therefore,  access  to  credit  by  small  businesses  would  be
reduced if foreign  banks were  to neglect small businesses  and/or drive domestic  banks  from the market,
destroying the information generated through bank-borrower relationships.
A  number  of recent  studies  have  shown  that  foreign  entry  seems to  improve  banking  system
efficiency  and  to contribute  to  overall  banking  stability  in  developing  countries  (see  Demirgiuc-Kunt,
Levine,  and  Min  (1998),  Levine  (1999),  Barajas  et  al. (2000),  Claessens  et al.  (2000),  Clarke  et al.
(2000),  and Dages et al. (2000)).  On the  other hand, the effect of foreign bank participation  on access to
credit  in developing countries remains largely unexplored.
Evidence from the United States indicates that large and organizationally  complex institutions
find it difficult to lend to informationally  opaque small and medium-sized enterprises  (see Berger and
Udell (1995), Berger et al. (1995), Keeton (1995), Levonian  and Soller (1995), Berger and Udell (1996),
Peek and Rosengren  (1996), and Strahan and Weston (1996)).  These organizational  diseconomies  might
explain why a number of studies have found that foreign banks, which as shown by Focarelli and Pozzolo
are typically large, appear to allocate greater shares of their lending to activities and sectors dominated by
large firms (see Goldberg (1992), Cho et al. (1987),  and Clarke et al. (2000))
While  large  foreign banks are unlikely to replicate the lending methods of small domestic  banks,
technological  innovation  could  offer  them  an  avenue  for  increasing  small  business  lending.  Mester
(1997) argues that advances in credit scoring methodologies,  coupled with enhanced  computer power and
increased data  availability,  are likely to change  the nature of small business  lending.  This suggests that
there could be a nonlinear, and, in  particular,  U-shaped  relation between  bank size and lending to small
businesses.  On  the  left-hand  side  would  be small  domestic  banks  engaged  in  relationship  lending  for
services  not  amenable to scoring.  On the right-hand  side would be  large  banks, many or most of them
foreign  owned,  offering  more  standard  products  to  small  businesses  based  on  credit  scoring  (Mester
(1997) and Peek and Rosengren (1998)).
The literature for the U.S. also suggests that the type of foreign entry may affect lending patterns.
For example, the evidence from the U.S. indicates that de novo entrants seem to devote larger shares of
2their assets to small businesses than other banks (See Goldberg and White (1998), DeYoung et al. (1999),
and Jenkins (2000)).
Foreign entry through merger and acquisitions (M&As) might have different effects on small
business lending.  Some studies find that M&As among small banks led to increased propensity to lend to
small businesses following their consolidation (Peek and Rosengren (1998), Walraven, (1997),  Strahan
and Weston (1998), Berger et al. (1998)).  However, when medium-sized  and large banks are involved, a
number of recent papers have reached conflicting conclusions.  Keeton (1996) and Berger et al. (1998)
uncovered that M&As tend to result in a reduction in small business lending when large banks are
involved, but Strahan and Weston (1998) found no significant  change in the ratio of small business loans
to assets following  large M&As.
There  is,  however,  very  little literature  that deals  directly with the  implications  of foreign  entry
for  lending  to  small  businesses  in  developing  countries.  Argentina  is  the  only country  for  which  we
found such studies.  Bleger and Rozenwurcel  (2000)  indicate that foreign bank participation  in Argentina
is  associated with  a reduction  of bank lending to small businesses  from around 20 to  16 percent of total
lending between  1996 and  1998.  In contrast, Escude et al. (2001)  find that despite their lower tendency to
lend  to  small businesses,  foreign  banks  have  increased  both  their  propensity  and their  market  share  of
lending  to the  sector  between  1998  and 2000.  Finally,  using  a  rich  data  set  on  Argentinean  business
debtors  in  December  1998,  Berger, Klapper,  and Udell  (2000)  find that large banks  and foreign  owned
banks are less inclined to extend credit to smaller firms, which  are likely to be informationally  opaque.
Given the paucity  of research  on  the impact  of foreign  bank  entry  on access  to credit  and the
importance  of this  issue from a policy  standpoint,  further  investigation  is clearly  warranted.  Using bank
level  data  for  Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia,  and  Peru  during  the  mid-1990s,  this  study  empirically
investigates  whether bank  origin  affects the share and  growth  rate of bank  lending  to small  businesses.
After Eastem Europe,  Latin  America has  been the  region  that most  rapidly and widely  allowed  foreign
bank  entry.  In  our  study,  we  focus  on  four  of the  most  important  countries  in  the  region  that  have
witnessed the largest  increase  in  foreign entry into their banking sectors.  Having  bank-level  time  series
3data  allows  us  to investigate  the  evolution  of lending to  small  businesses  over time,  in  particular,  as
foreign penetration increases.  Because we analyze this question  for a number of countries,  we are able to
examine whether foreign entry has a uniform impact on lending to small businesses across countries.
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  II  presents  a brief overview  of the Argentinean,
Chilean,  Colombian,  and  Peruvian  banking  sectors.  Section  III  discusses  the data used  in this  paper.
Section  IV presents  descriptive  statistics on the extent  to which  foreign banks  lend  to small businesses,
relative to their domestic counterparts.  Section V explains the econometric  methodology, while section VI
presents  the empirical  results.  In  Section VII we conduct a preliminary exploration  of the cross-country
differences in our results. Finally, section VIII concludes.
II. Banks in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru: An Overview
Both  the number of banks and the distribution  of their  sizes vary across the four countries,  and
this could have implications  for lending to small businesses (see Figure  1). Colombia with a population of
41.6 million had the second lowest number of banks  (27) in 2000.  Chile, which has a population of 15.0
million, or just over  one-third that  of Colombia,  had  28  banks.  Peru  resembles  Colombia  more  than
Chile.  Its  25.2 million residents  are  served  by 19 banks.  Finally,  Argentina had  the highest  number of
banks per resident - 91  banks serve a population of 36.6 million.
Not  only are  there more banks per capita  in Argentina and  Chile,  but also they  are  larger than
those  in Colombia  and Peru.  In  both  Chile and  Argentina,  the largest  banks  have  between  15  and  20
billion dollars in assets.  In Colombia, the largest banks have 3 to 4 billion dollars  in assets.  In Peru, this
figure ranges between  4 to 6 billion dollars.  Relatively  small banks  comprise an inordinate share  of the
total in all four countries.  However,  small banks in Chile are larger than those in Peru and Colombia.
In Argentina,  there are  still a large number of very small banks.  This is likely to diminish as the
process of consolidation  continues  there.  In  the  early  1990s,  Argentina  had  more  than  200 financial
institutions.  Less than half that number  are now  in operation,  and  some of the  current banks  are new
entrants.  While several banks have failed, many have been acquired by or merged with other entities.  In
the period covered  by our data (June  1998  to March 2000), there were eighteen  mergers or acquisitions,
4ten  of which  involved  foreign  banks.  The  period  between  the  Tequila  Crisis  in  late  1994  and  the
beginning of our sample witnessed even greater consolidation (see World Bank 1998).
Argentina  experienced  the  most mergers  and acquisitions  in the  late  1990s.  However,  Chile,
Colombia,  and Peru have also undergone  a process  of consolidation.  In Colombia  and Peru, there  were
seven mergers or acquisitions, four of which involved foreign banks. Chile had six such transactions,  half
involving  foreign banks.  Argentina also  led the way with seven de novo entrants,  compared  to two for
Peru  and  none  in  either  Chile  or  Colombia.  In  our  empirical  analysis,  we  control  for  the  effects  of
mergers, acquisitions, and de novo entry on the share and growth rate of lending to small businesses.
The  ratio of banking  sector assets to GDP  provides another  indication  that Colombia  and Peru
have  a  lower  level  of financial  intermediation  than  Argentina  and  Chile  (see  Figure  2).  Both  for
Colombia  and  Peru that  ratio  hovered  near  forty  percent,  and was  declining  at the  end of our  sample
period.  To  some  extent,  these dips were due to  Colombia's  intemal  conflict  and banking crisis  and to
Peru's scandals at the end of the Fujimori  administration.  By way of comparison,  in Argentina the ratio
of banking  sector assets  to  GDP went from  48  percent  in  1998  to  56  percent  in  2000.  Owing  to the
hyperinflation of the late  1980s, Argentina started the 1990s with a very low ratio of banking sector assets
to GDP.  However,  with the exception  of the Tequila Crisis, that ratio has grown relatively steadily since
the  adoption  of the  Convertibility  Plan  in  1991,  which  brought  about  price stability.  Chile's  banking
development occurred  earlier.  By  1996, banking  sector assets were nearly  140 percent of GDP, and that
figure had grown  to over 180  percent by 2000.  It  is true that much  of the Chilean  banks'  assets  are in
assets  other than  loans,  and  that  banking  assets  relative  to  GDP may  overstate  their  relative  level  of
development.  However, Chile holds a sizable advantage over the other three countries on other measures
of financial development such as the ratio of private credit to GDP.2
The evidence  on foreign penetration  also indicates that Chile and Argentina differ from Colombia
and Peru (see Figure  3).  In Colombia,  foreign banks comprise  forty percent of the total  number, but they
account  for only a quarter of banking sector  loans.  In Peru, over half the banks are foreign-owned,  but
they are responsible  for forty  percent of total  system  loans.  There is a key difference  between the two
5countries.  In Peru, the  share of loans  held by foreign  banks  grew throughout  the  late  1990s, while  in
Colombia  it  declined  slightly.  Still,  foreign  banks  held  only  about  a quarter  of total  loans  in  both
countries throughout most of the period.
By the end of the period, foreign banks held over 50 percent of Argentina's banking sector loans,
and almost 45 percent of Chile's.  Chile's foreign bank share climbed throughout  our sample period.  In
Argentina,  most of that growth  occurred  prior to our sample period.  However, data on lending to small
businesses for Argentina was only available  since 1998, and thus our sample period is shorter than that for
Chile.  The key point, however,  is that foreign banks comprised a substantially  larger share of bank loans
in Argentina and Chile than in Colombia or Peru.
Judging  from  the  U.S.  empirical  evidence  one  might  expect  that  small  borrowers  would  fare
relatively worse in Argentina  and Chile.  Those countries  experienced greater foreign penetration  and had
much  larger  banks than  in Colombia  or Peru.  Moreover,  in Argentina,  foreign  entry coincided with a
massive  consolidation  in  which  many  small  banks  left  the  market  either  through  merger  or  failure.
Section V tests these conjectures  explicitly.
III. The Data
To  analyze  domestic  and  foreign  bank  lending  to  small  businesses,  we  assembled  a
comprehensive  bank  level  database  for  Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia,  and  Peru during the  1990s.  These
countries'  central  banks  and  bank  superintendencies  were  our  main  sources  of data.  We  gathered
information  on the origin (foreign  or domestic)  of each  bank  in these countries  throughout  the sample.
Moreover,  we  identified  whether  foreign  banks  entered  into the  banking  system  through  a  process  of
mergers  and acquisitions  with  previously existing institutions  or by creating a new  institution or de novo
bank.  In  general,  the  first type  of entry  is  likely to  result  in higher  bank  concentration,  especially  if
foreign  banks  acquire large domestic  institutions.  Second, we gathered  data on the distribution  of bank
lending by size.  When information  about small business loans was not available as a separate  category,
small business  loans were  defined by the size of the loan, instead of borrower size.  Finally, we collected
6balance sheets and income  statements  for all the financial  institutions to control for the performance  and
health of domestic and foreign banks when comparing lending patterns across these institutions.
Argentina
According  to  a  recent  study  on  small  business  lending  conducted  by  the  central  bank  of
Argentina, loans to this sector go to businesses with total debt between  50,000 and 2.5 million dollars (see
Escude  et al.  (2001)).  Since we  do  not have  information  on  borrowers'  total  debt,  we  use bank  level
information  on  total  lending  stratified  by  loan  size  for  the  period  1998-2000.  According  to  the
aforementioned  study, a small business with up to 2.5 million dollars  in debt, on average borrows up to  I
million dollars from any individual  bank.  Thus, we define as loans to small businesses all loans up to this
amount.
Chile
For Chile small business  loans are identified based on the total debt of the business rather than the
size of individual  loans.  Total debt is measured  by the Chilean Banking  Superintendency  in 'unidades de
fomento'  (UF), which are equal to a fixed quantity of Chilean pesos  indexed to inflation.  Following the
guidelines  provided by the  Superintendency,  we  define as  small business  lending all  loans to borrowers
with  less than UF50,000 in total debt, which is roughly equal to  1.5 million dollars.3
Colombia
The  Superintendency  of Banks  in  Colombia  requires  banks  to  keep  a  separate  record  of the
amount  of loans they give to small  firms registered  with the Superintendency  of Businesses.  According
to Colombian regulations,  small businesses are those with assets  up to  1.7  million dollars. For each bank
in Colombia,  we obtained quarterly information  on the loans to the 4,067 small businesses registered with
the Superintendency  of Businesses  over the period  1997-1999.  Because this might be  a partial  list of all
small businesses  in Colombia,  we should be careful  in trying to draw conclusions across countries.
Peru
Officials  from the  Peruvian  Banking  Superintendency  estimate  that  small  business  loans  range
between  $20,000 and $500,000.  Thus, using a breakdown of bank lending by size for loans to businesses
7prepared  by  the  Peruvian  Banking  Superintendency,  we  defined  small  business  loans  as  loans  to
businesses up to $500,000.
IV. Profile of Small Business Lending in Latin America
Table  1 and 2  provide  some summary  statistics  on the share  and growth  rate of small  business
lending by domestic and foreign  banks in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru during 1997-2000.  Also,
within these tables we distinguish  between  large  and  small, foreign  and domestic  banks.  We consider
large banks to be those in the top 5 percentile of the distribution of banks assets.
According to  Table  1, comparing  all domestic  banks  with  all  foreign  banks  (i.e.,  without  any
regard  for size),  we find  that foreign  banks  in all  four countries  in our sample  devote a lower share  of
their total lending to small businesses.  However,  these shares are not significantly different in the case of
Colombia.  In fact, Colombia  looks very different from the other countries not only because the shares of
small business  lending by domestic and foreign banks are not significantly  different from each other, but
also  because  the  shares  of lending to  small  businesses  in  Colombia  are  several  orders  of magnitude
smaller than what we find for other countries. While for the other three countries the share of lending to
small  businesses ranges between  18 and 30 percent  depending on the country and the origin of the bank,
for Colombia this share does not exceed 2 percent.  Again, this might be due to the fact that data on small
business lending  is available  only for the 4,067 firms registered  with the Superintendency  of Businesses.
Thus, while  it seems  acceptable to compare the share  of small business  loans for foreign  and domestic
banks  in Colombia,  it might not be fair to make comparisons  between  small business  lending shares  in
Colombia and the remaining countries.
If we separate  banks according  to  size and  origin,  we find that regardless  of bank origin  small
banks lend more to small businesses than large banks.  Further, in all four countries,  small foreign banks
devote a lower share of their total lending to small businesses than small domestic banks.  The difference
between  small foreign and domestic banks is statistically significant in all countries except Colombia.  In
contrast, the picture for large banks  is quite different.  Although large foreign banks appear to lend less to
8small  businesses  than large  domestic  banks  in Argentina  and  Peru, the reverse  seems  true in  Chile  and
Colombia.  This suggests that large and small foreign banks might behave differently  in some countries.
If lending to small businesses  grows at a slower pace than other types of lending it is possible that
the  share of lending  to this  sector  could  be  dropping,  while the  growth  rate of the  level  could  still  be
positive.  Thus, to distinguish  between  the behavior of the share and the level of small  business lending,
Table 2 present tests of differences  in mean  growth  rates  of small business  lending across domestic  and
foreign banks for all  four countries,  Table 2  shows that in Argentina,  Chile, and Colombia,  the annual
small  business lending growth  is lower for foreign banks relative to domestic  banks.  For Argentina  and
Colombia,  this result  is coming  from the behavior  of small foreign banks,  since the large  foreign  banks
seem to outperform the large domestic banks. Peru is the one case where the growth rate of small business
lending by foreign banks is positive and significantly different from that observed  for domestic banks.4
V. Empirical Methodology
Differences  in  the  mean  share  or  in the  growth  rate  of lending  to  small  businesses  between
domestic  and foreign banks might be driven  by factors  other than bank origin that we are not controlling
for. Thus, we tum to regression analysis to study the impact of bank origin on small business  lending.
For each  country,  we  estimate equations (la)  and (lb) below in order to examine  the impact of
bank  origin  on  the  share  of bank  lending  to small  businesses,  controlling  for  other  factors  that might
influence this ratio.
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9Equations (1  a) and (1  b) are estimated in log-odds  logit form where j= I.. .X represents the country
identifier,  i=l ...N captures  each  individual  bank within a country,  and t=l ...T refers  to the time  periods
considered.  Pit is the proportion  of loans  made  by banks to  small businesses.  Focusing on the log odds
ratio rather than the share gets around the problem that shares are by definition bounded between 0 and 1.
Equation  (la) and (lb) model the ratio  of small business  loans to total  loans as a function  of a
number of bank indicators,  including  bank origin.  We also include a general time trend (TREND) in the
estimations  to  control  for  changes  in  the  share  of  lending  to  small  businesses  associated  with
macroeconomic variables  or any other factors that are common among banks over time.
ORIGIN  is  a dummy variable  for whether the bank is owned by domestic  or foreign  interests.
This variable  takes a value of one for foreign  banks.  The ORIGIN  dummy  is also interacted  with  the
yearly trend to capture changes in foreign banks'  share of lending to small businesses.  By focusing on the
sign and significance  of the coefficients  on ORIGIN  and the interaction  term,  we can  study whether we
observe different lending patterns for foreign and domestic banks.
In  most  countries  in our sample,  there  are  three kinds of foreign banks,  namely,  those that had
been  operating  in the country  for  a number  of years  before  our sample  starts  (e.g.  Citibank  in all  four
countries), de novo foreign banks that started operating at some point in the sample, and banks that within
our  sample  acquired  other domestic  or  foreign  banks.  As noted  in the  literature,  there  are  reasons to
expect that these types of banks might behave  differently towards small businesses.  In the U.S.  literature
for example, de novo banks,  in particular, have been found to be more apt to lend to small businesses than
other foreign entrants,  while mergers  among  large  banks have resulted in lower shares of small business
lending.  To allow for differences  in the impact that the mode of entry by foreign banks has on the share
of lending to small businesses,  we include separate  dummies for foreign de novo banks (FDENOVO)  and
for  those  foreign  banks  that  either  entered  the  system  or  increased  in  size  by  acquiring  domestic
institutions  (FDACQUIRER).  Both  of these  dummy  variables  are  also  interacted  with  a  variable
measuring the time since entry or acquisition ("AGE") to capture changes  in their small business lending
as they became  better established  in the market.
10Because  consolidation  by domestic  banks or between  two foreign banks could have an impact on
the share of small business  lending, we include  a dummy for mergers that did not involve  a foreign bank
merging  with or acquiring a domestic  institution (MERGER).  We also interact this variable  with a trend
to control for the dynamic  impact of bank consolidation (independent of ownership)  and lending to small
businesses.
SIZE  refers  to  the  log  of real  total  assets.5 In  equation  (lb),  we  include  a  size-squared  term
(SIZE2) to account for the possible non-linearity  in the relation between  bank  size  and  lending to small
businesses. Also, by interacting  size and size squared with a dummy for bank origin, this equation allows
for the possibility  that the  impact of size  on the  share of bank  lending to  small  businesses  is  different
between domestic and foreign banks.
Publicly owned banks  operate  in three out of the four countries  in our sample (Argentina,  Chile,
and  Colombia).  Because  public  bank  lending  decisions  could  be  affected  by  politics  and  not  by
commercial  factors, we include a dummy (PUBLIC) to control for this type of banks in our estimations.6
FCIAL refers to two financial  health and performance  indicators, return on assets and the ratio of
administrative  expenses to total assets.  It is unclear  what is the expected  sign on these variables.  On the
one hand,  banks with positive return  on assets might  be more able to grow over time and to expand  into
areas  where  it  takes  time  and  effort  to  acquire  the  know-how  of the  business,  like  lending  to  small
borrowers.  On  the  other hand,  banks  with  low  return  on  assets might  be  more  willing to "gamble  for
resurrection"  by venturing  into higher risk segments, like lending to small businesses. Banks with  higher
ratios of administrative  expenses to assets might be better suited to lend to small businesses,  if their high
expenses  are  associated with a more extensive  branch  network and a larger labor  force that can provide
the personalized  attention and monitoring that is needed  when  lending to small businesses.  On the other
hand, banks with high administrative  expenses might be  at a disadvantage to compete with other banks in
lending to small businesses.
The share regressions  provide important  information about the impact of foreign entry on lending
to small businesses, but they cannot tell us for certain whether such lending increased  or decreased during
11this period.  For example, those regressions  could indicate that the share of lending to small businesses by
foreign banks was falling relative to shares at domestic banks while, at the same time, foreign  banks'  total
lending to small  businesses  was actually  increasing.  The decline  in the share of small business  lending
would occur because  that  line of business was  not growing as fast as other lines of business  at foreign
banks,  but there would be real growth in small business lending nonetheless.  For these reasons, we also
run regressions in which the dependent variable is the growth rate in real lending to small businesses.
Both equations (2a) and (2b) examine the impact of bank origin on the growth rate of real lending
to small businesses  (SBLGROWTH).  Equation  (2b) allows  for the possibility that the impact of size on
lending to small businesses might depend on bank origin.
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Once again, j=l ...X represents  the country identifier, i=1 ...N captures each individual bank within
a country,  and t=l ...T refers to the time periods considered. All regressors are defined above. The lending
growth  specifications  differ from  those for shares of small  business  lending  in one  sense.  Because the
dependent  variable  already  captures  dynamic  effects,  there  is no  need  to include  interaction  terms to
measure trends over time.'
VI. Empirical Results
As described above, we estimate two types of regressions, one for shares of total lending devoted
to  small businesses  (share regressions)  and one  for real  growth  rates in small business  lending (growth
regressions).  In some of the share and growth  regressions, we  interact foreign ownership with bank size
to explore whether large foreign banks behaved differently towards small businesses than did other banks.
We discuss each of  these four estimations in turn.
12A.  Share regressions  - No bank size interactions
Table 3 reports the results from equation  (1  a) assuming the impact of size on the share of lending
to small businesses  is linear and  is restricted to be the  same  for domestic  and foreign  banks.  For our
purposes, the key variable from this base regression  is the foreign ownership dummy, which is negative in
most cases,  but significant  only in the  case of Chile.  Therefore,  controlling  for other factors,  a typical
foreign  bank did not  devote a significantly lower share of its lending to small  businesses  in Argentina,
Colombia, and Peru.
In  all countries  except  Argentina,  the coefficient  on the time  trend  is  negative  and  statistically
significant,  indicating that lending to small businesses as a share of total lending was falling over time for
domestically  owned banks.  The coefficient  is positive and statistically  insignificant in the regression  for
Argentina.  The coefficient  on the interaction between  the time trend and the foreign ownership dummy is
negative  in the regressions  for all  four countries,  but  it is  statistically  significant  at conventional  levels
only for Peru. Thus, except for the case of Peru, there is no consistent indication that the share of lending
grew at a slower rate (or fell at a faster rate) for foreign banks vis-a-vis domestic  institutions.
In  this  specification,  size has  a negative  impact  on  lending  to small  businesses.  This effect  is
significant only in the case of Argentina  and Peru.  Private domestic  banks generally appear to lend more
to small businesses (as a share of total lending) than state-owned  banks, after controlling for other factors
that might  affect lending.  The  coefficient  on  the dummy  indicating govemment  ownership  is negative
and statistically  significant  in the regressions  for all three  countries with  state-owned  banks (Argentina,
Chile  and Colombia).  One frequently  heard justification  for state banks  is that they resolve credit market
failures by emphasizing lending to small businesses.  These results appear to undercut that justification.
Finally,  the regressions  also  include a series  of dummies  to control  for the effects  of mergers,
acquisitions,  purchases  of existing  foreign  banks by new foreign  entrants,  and de novo entry by foreign
banks.  These variables are included to control  for the possibility that banks recently involved  in mergers
and  banks  that  have  only  recently  entered  might  take  some  time  to  reach  their  desired  portfolio
allocations.  To allow banks  to slowly  adjust their portfolio allocations,  variables  representing the time
13since  the  merger  or  entry  occurred  are  also  included.  In  Argentina,  where  the  largest  number  of
transactions took place,  we are able to include more dummies than in the other countries.  However, since
there  were  very  few  mergers  during  our  sample  period  in  most of the  countries,  and  because  some
observations are lost due to missing or incomplete data, the coefficient estimates are often based on only a
few merger/entry observations.  Consequently,  these variables might best be thought of as controlling  for
temporary  disequilibria following mergers and new entry, which thus enables us to estimate more reliably
the coefficients  for the banks not involved in such transactions.
Given the limited  number of observations,  it is not surprising that the merger/entry  variables  do
not tell  a very consistent  story across  countries.  We briefly mention  only a couple of the results  from
those variables. The very limited evidence on de novo entry, which comes only from the share regressions
for Argentina,  appears  to indicate that contrary  to the U.S. experience,  foreign  de novo entrants do not
concentrate  on  small  business  financing.  Results  for the rest  of the  merger/entry  variables  show  little
consistency across types  of regression  or across  countries.  For example,  in equation  (1),  the impact  of
foreign acquisitions  (i.e., existing foreign banks acquiring domestic banks) on lending to small businesses
is negative  and significant for Argentina,  positive and significant for Chile, and insignificant  in Colombia
and Peru.  Similar  inconsistencies across countries are found for all the regression types discussed  below.
The effect  of the  mode  of entry  on the  lending  behavior  of foreign  banks  is an  important topic.  We
simply lack the number of observations necessary to provide consistent evidence on this issue.8
B.  Share regressions  - large  vs. small banks
Equation (lb)  allows for non-linearities  in the relationship  between  size and  the share of small
business  lending  and  for  interactions  between  size  and  size  squared  with  origin,  in order to  explore
whether  bank size  changes  the  impact  of foreign  ownership  on  lending  to  small  businesses.  Table 4
reports the results from this specification.  The null hypothesis  that the two coefficients  on the interaction
terms  are  jointly  zero  can  be  rejected  at a  10  percent  level  or  higher  in the  regressions  for  all  four
countries.9 Similarly,  the null hypothesis that the two coefficients  on the squared terms  are jointly zero
14can  also be  rejected  at similar  levels.'0 This  strongly  suggests  that it  is  appropriate  to  include  these
additional terms.
Once the interaction and squared terms are included, it becomes more difficult to see how foreign
ownership  affects the  share of lending to small businesses  based  simply upon the coefficient values.  To
make it easier to interpret  the results, Figures 4-7 show estimated lending to small businesses (as a share
of total lending) for foreign and domestic banks."'  Estimated  shares are calculated  for banks of different
sizes  using  coefficients  from  Table  4  in  the  final  period  for  each  country,  using  median  values  of
continuous  variables (other than size) for banks of that type and assuming that the bank was not involved
in any mergers or acquisitions.
Although medium and large domestic banks  generally lend less to small businesses (as a share of
total  lending)  than small  domestic banks,  lending  shares generally  decline  slowly for medium and large
banks  as  size  increases  in  some countries.  In  fact,  in  the two  cases with  the  largest  banks,  Chile  and
Argentina,  lending to small businesses appears to actually increase as size increases for medium and large
domestic  banks  (see figures 4 and  5).  In contrast  to the results for the other three  countries,  lending  to
small  businesses  in  Colombia  increases  as  a  share of total  lending  for very  small  banks  before  slowly
declining (see figure 6).
The pattern for foreign-owned  banks appears quite different from the pattern  for domestic banks.
Although  small foreign banks  lend considerably  less to small businesses  than small domestic banks in  all
four  countries,  medium  to  large  foreign  banks  generally  appear  similar  to  medium  to  large  domestic
banks.  In  fact,  in  two  of the  four  countries,  Chile  and Colombia,  estimated  shares  of small  business
lending for large foreign banks are larger than for large domestic banks (see Figures 5 and 6).  In the other
two countries,  Argentina  and Peru,  although  foreign  banks  of all  sizes  lend  lower  shares  than  similar
domestic banks,  the difference  is smaller for large banks than it is for small banks (see Figures 4 and 7)  12
These results,  and especially those for Chile, are consistent with the notion that large foreign banks, using
credit scoring methodologies,  enhanced computer power,  and improved  data availability,  will increasingly
enter small business lending.  We seek further confirmation  in the growth rate regressions  below.
15C.  Growth rate regressions
Table  5 includes regressions  with the annual growth  of small  business lending  as the dependent
variable.  13  As  noted  previously,  although  dummy  variables  in  the  growth  regressions  might  have  a
similar  interpretation  to  the  trend  variables  in  the  share  regressions,  their  coefficients  could  differ.
However,  in the regressions  following equation  (2a) that omit the interaction  between  size and  foreign
ownership,  the  results  for  the  foreign  ownership  dummy  are  broadly  consistent  with  those  for  the
interaction between the time trend variables and bank origin in the share regressions.
The  coefficient  on  the  dummy  indicating  foreign  ownership  is  negative  and  statistically
significant  in  the  regressions  for  Argentina  and  Colombia;  positive  and  statistically  significant  in  the
regression  for Peru;  and positive  and  statistically insignificant  in the regression  for Chile  (see columns
(5.1), (5.3), (5.5) and (5.7)).  The results for Argentina and Colombia are consistent with the results from
the  share  regressions,  with  lending  shares  by  foreign  banks  increasing  more  slowly  than  for similar
domestically  owned  banks.  The  coefficients  for Chile  are  statistically  insignificant  in  both  types  of
regressions.  The  one  exception  is  Peru,  where  the  coefficient  on  the  origin  dummy  is  positive  and
statistically significant in the growth regression,  while the coefficient  on the interaction  between the trend
term and the origin dummy in the share regressions  is negative and statistically significant.  Although this
might seem  contradictory,  given  the rapid growth  of total assets held  by foreign banks,  from  about  15
percent of total  assets  in December  1996  to nearly 40  percent of assets  in March  2000, the two results
might not be surprising - small business lending by  foreign banks was growing, just not as fast as other
types of lending by foreign banks.
There  is also  broad consistency  between  the share  regressions  and the growth  rate regressions
with respect to  state-owned  banks.  The  coefficient  on the  dummy variable  for state  ownership  in the
growth regressions  is negative  and statistically significant in two of the countries with state-owned  banks,
Chile  and  Colombia,  indicating  that  lending  to  small  businesses  by state-owned  banks  was  growing
slower than lending by private domestically owned banks.  For the final country with  state-owned  banks,
Argentina,  the coefficient  on the dummy variable indicating  state ownership  is positive, but statistically
16insignificant.  These  results are robust to  including the  interaction  between  size and  foreign ownership.
The  results  provide  further  indication  that small  business  lending might  not  be a primary objective  of
state-owned  banks.
D.  Growth rate regressions  - Large vs. small banks
In  the  regressions  omitting  the  interaction  term  between  size  and  foreign  ownership,  the
correlation between  size  and growth  in  small  business  lending is positive  for Argentina  and Chile  (see
columns  (5.1)  and (5.3)).  This appears to  be largely  because  growth was  faster for large  foreign  banks
than  it was for small  foreign banks.  In the growth  regressions that include  the interaction between  size
and  foreign  ownership, the coefficient  on  size becomes  smaller but remains positive  for Argentina,  and
becomes  negative  and statistically  insignificant for Chile.  In contrast, the coefficients  on the  interaction
term  between  size  and origin are  large, positive,  and statistically  significant  in the  regressions  for both
countries (see columns (5.2) and (5.4)).
This suggests that lending to small businesses was growing  considerably  faster for large  foreign-
owned  banks  than it was  for small  foreign-owned  banks,  while the differences  between  large and small
domestic  banks were  smaller.  Figures 8  and 9 show estimated  growth of lending to small businesses for
foreign  and  domestically owned  banks of different sizes for these two countries.  In both  Argentina  and
Chile, although lending to small businesses was growing more slowly for small foreign-owned  banks than
it was  for small domestically  owned banks,  the reverse was true for large  banks.  This  is our strongest
evidence that large foreign  banks were  increasingly  lending to small  businesses.  In the next section, we
discuss why this occurred in Argentina and Chile, but not in Colombia or Peru.
The  statistically  insignificant  coefficient  on  the  interaction  term  for  both  Colombia  and  Peru
suggests that size affected growth of small  business lending similarly for foreign and domestically owned
banks in these countries.  However, this does not imply that loan growth  rates for foreign banks were less
than those  for domestic  banks.  The  coefficient on  the dummy variable  indicating  foreign  ownership  is
also  statistically  insignificant  in  Colombia,  which  suggests  that  growth  in  lending  was  similar  for
similarly-sized  foreign  and domestically  owned banks.'4 Moreover,  when the interaction term  is omitted
17for  Peru,  the  coefficient  on  the  origin  dummy  variable  becomes  positive  and  statistically  significant
suggesting  that  lending  to small  businesses was  growing  faster there  for both  large  and small  foreign-
owned banks than it was for similar domestic banks.
The small  business  lending by foreign banks  in Colombia  and Peru may have been qualitatively
different than  that undertaken  by  large  foreign  banks  in Argentina  and  Chile,  but we  do  find evidence
from the loan  growth regressions  from all  four countries that suggests that foreign banks (or a subset of
them) were expanding such lending at least as fast as both private domestic and state-owned  banks during
this period.'5 These results appear to undercut claims that foreign banks  are unable or unwilling to enter
the small business lending niche in developing countries.
VII. Explaining differences  in small business lending across countries: a preliminary exploration
Our  empirical  results  suggest  that  large  foreign  banks  are  more  inclined  to  lending  to  small
businesses in Argentina and Chile than in Colombia and Peru.  The growth rate regressions for Argentina
and Chile show that large foreign banks increased their lending at faster rates than large  domestic banks.
In Argentina, the  large foreign banks  had the highest estimated  growth rates among all  banks.  In Chile,
but not Argentina,  large foreign banks  devoted higher shares of their portfolios to small  business lending
than  all  banks,  but the  smallest  domestic  ones.  Although  many  explanations  might be consistent  with
these results, we briefly explore three possible causal factors:  the quality of the contracting environment,
the structure of the banking sector, and the macroeconomic  environment.
A.  Contracting  Environment
Table 6 compares the countries  using four indices that capture  somewhat  different aspects of the
quality of the contracting  environment.  Figures  for the United  Kingdom  and the United  States  are also
included as reference  points.  These indices, whose constructions and sources are described in detail in the
notes  attached  to  Table  6,  have  become  standard  tools  in  cross-country  empirical  studies  of financial
development  and economic  growth.  For three  of the indices  - the  Index of Freedom's measure  of the
security of property rights, BERI's  measure of contract enforcement,  and the ICRG  measure of the Rule
of Law - the rankings are almost identical.  Chile finishes first, followed relatively closely by Argentina.
18Colombia and Peru finish third or fourth depending  on the index.  The gap between  Argentina  and Chile
is typically much smaller than that between  Argentina and either Colombia or Peru.
The remaining  index,  developed  by La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer,  and Vishny  (LLSV),
measures  the  strength  of the  legal  rights  afforded  to  creditors  in  the  event  of bankruptcy  or  firm
reorganization.  It  summarizes  the  types  of laws that  are  on the  books  rather  than  the  quality of the
enforcerment of those laws.  In that sense, the index differs  from the other three,  although, like the others,
it indicates  that laws in  Chile and Argentina protect creditors  better than  in Colombia or Peru.  In short,
on  a  number  of indicators,  Chile  and  Argentina  provide  better  contracting  environments  than  either
Colombia or Peru, and this could  partially explain  why large  foreign banks are more  inclined to lend to
small businesses in those countries.  We speculate that large foreign banks that use scoring methodologies
to deliver relatively  standardized  loan  products to a high number of small businesses  or individuals  need
assurances that, in the event of default, recoveries can be made in a timely fashion.
These  indices  might  also  help  resolve  why  both  the  share  and  the  growth  rate  regressions
indicated  that  large  foreign  banks  in  Chile  were  emphasizing  small  business  lending,  while  only  the
growth rate regressions  provided similar evidence  for Argentina.  As noted, Chile held a slight edge over
Argentina on these  indices,  which  suggests that they enjoyed  an  adequate  contracting  environment  for a
longer  period.  Large foreign  banks in Chile  may have had enough time to reach their equilibrium  shares
of lending to  small  business.  In Argentina,  an  adequate  contracting  environment  arrived  later  than  in
Chile,  and  thus  large  foreign  banks  likely  had  still  not achieved  equilibrium  shares  of small  business
lending by the end of the period.
B.  Structure of Banking Sector
The number and size of the banks in each country can also help explain the pattem  of results.  In
Peru,  for example,  there  were  no foreign  banks  that approached  the size  of the  largest  domestic  ones
(refer to Figure  1).  As a result, the type of small  business  lending undertaken  by large foreign  banks  in
Argentina and Chile was not a possibility in Peru.  Of course, the fact that no large banks operated  in Peru
during this period is  itself telling.  It seems plausible that the weak contracting environment  discouraged
19their entry.  Although some foreign banks were among the largest in Colombia, none of them compared to
the largest banks  in  Chile or Argentina.  Colombia's  foreign  banks, too,  might have been  too small to
engage in small business lending through credit scoring.
C.  Macroeconomic environment
The top  panel in  Figure  10 provides  real  growth  rates for each  of the  four countries over this
period.  Because  they exhibit almost the same  growth patterns,  it is unlikely that this factor can account
for the  differences  in results across  countries.  One  exception  to the  pattern  is Argentina  in  1995  and
1996, which, while recovering  from the Tequila Crisis,  was experiencing  slower,  but increasing growth,
while  the others  were  generally  experiencing  faster,  but declining  growth.  However,  our  sample  for
Argentina starts in 1998.  The bottom panel in Figure 10 does indicate, however, that Argentina and Chile
both enjoyed  lower inflation than either Colombia or Peru during this period.  This, too, might have made
it  easier  for  large  foreign  banks  to  lend  to  small  businesses.  In  short,  it  seems  plausible  that  the
contracting  environment,  the  structure  of the banking  sector,  and price  stability  all  might have made  it
easier for large foreign banks  in Argentina and Chile to  lend to small businesses.  However,  further  work
is probably needed to confirm these suppositions.
VIII. Conclusions
As foreign participation  increases  in the banking sectors of developing countries,  many questions
remain  unanswered.  Key  among  them  is  the  issue of whether  foreign  banks  tend to  shy away  from
lending to small  businesses.  Using bank  level data  for Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia,  and Peru  over the
mid- 1  990s, this paper examines  the impact of foreign bank entry on the share and growth rate of lending
to small businesses, while controlling for other factors that might affect lending to this sector.
Consistent with  evidence  from the  U.S., we  find that  medium and  large domestic  banks  in the
four countries we  study devote  less of their lending (as  share  of total  lending) to small  businesses  than
small  domestic  banks.  Also,  in  most  countries,  the  share  of lending  devoted  to  small  businesses  by
domestic  banks was dropping in the  late  1990s, as evidenced  by the negative and significant trend in the
share estimations.
20Contrary to popular belief, public  banks do not appear  to surpass  private  banks in the extent  to
which they lend to small businesses.  This would seem to indicate  that the argument that privatization  of
public banks would hurt small businesses is, at best, weak.
Regarding  the impact of foreign  bank  entry on  lending  to  small  businesses  we find,  consistent
with  conventional  wisdom,  that,  on  average,  foreign  banks  in the  four  countries  generally  lent  less  to
small  businesses  (as  share  of total  lending)  than  private  domestic  banks  (at  least by  end  of period).
However,  the difference  appears to be  primarily due to the behavior of small  foreign  banks.  In  all four
cases,  small  foreign  banks  lent  considerably  less  to  small  businesses  than  small  domestic  banks.  In
contrast,  the  difference  was  considerably  smaller  for  large  and  medium-sized  banks.  In  fact,  after
controlling  for other factors that might affect lending, large  foreign banks actually  appear to lend more to
small  businesses  (as  share  of total  lending)  than  large  domestic  banks  in two  of the  four  case  study
countries,  Chile and Colombia.
Finally,  in  Argentina  and Chile, the two  cases  where the ratio of banking  sector  assets to GDP
consistently grew  over the sample  period, lending to small businesses by medium and large foreign banks
was  positive  and was  growing  more  quickly  than for  similar  domestic  banks.  In  contrast,  lending by
small foreign banks was shrinking  and was growing far more slowly than for similar domestic banks.
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23Table 1: Means Tests on Small Business  Lending Shares
Argentina  Chile  Colombia  Peru
Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean
(in %)  (in °/O)  (in %)  (in °/O)
All Domestic Banks  25.7  29.8  1.9  23.8
All Foreign Banks  19.7  24.1  1.8  17.9
(6.293)  ***  (5.574)  ***  (1.087)  (4.608)  ***
Large Domestic Banks  16.9  19.3  1.0  15.8
Large Foreign Banks  9.9  24.3  1.3  10.2
(6.451)  ***  -(1.577)  -(3.783)  **  (3.774) ***
Small Domestic Banks  26.4  30.5  2.0  24.6
Small Foreign Banks  21.8  24.1  1.8  18.2
(4.324) ***  (6.132)  ***  (1.065)  (4.905)  ***
Null hypothesis: Mean(domestic)-Mean(foreign)=0
t-stats are in parenthesis
*, **, *** denote significance  at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively
Table 2: Means Tests on Small Business Lending  Growth Rates
Argentina  Chile  Colombia  Peru
Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean
(m %)  (in °/O)  (in %/O)  (in %)
All Domestic Banks  8.1  7.2  -12.9  -2.8
All Foreign Banks  -3.8  0.0  -22.9  19.5
(3.326) ***  (2.798)  ***  (1.604)  -(4.281)  **
Large Domestic Banks  14.9  13.8  -24.7
Large Foreign Banks  27.0  -0.2  -2.1
-(2.142)  **  (1.399)  -(1.603)
Small Domestic Banks  7.6  6.8  -12.1  -1.9
Small Foreign Banks  -6.5  0.0  -23.8  19.5
(3.659)  *  (2.569) **  (1.794) *  -(3.886) *
Null hypothesis: Mean(domestic)-Mean(foreign)=0
t-stats in parenthesis
*, *,  *** denote significance  at the  10%, 5%, and  1%  level, respectively
24Table 3: Base Share of Small Business  Lending Regressions
Variables  Argentina  Chile  Colombia  Peru
Log of real assets  -0.115  -0.017  -0.040  -0.233
(Lagged I period)  (-4.73)  (-0.58)  (-0.29)  (-6.02)
Return on assets  -0.026  -6.255  -5.674  11.794
(Lagged 1  period)  (-0.61)  (-0.89)  (-0.84)  (0.88)
Administrative  expenses/assets  0.422  -5.519  -5.934  -41.651
(Lagged I period)  -2.79  (-0.79)  (-1.65)  (-4.88)
Public bank dummy  -0.606 *  -0.857  ***  -0.466  **
(-8.21)  (-7.95)  (-1.97)
Time trend  0.063  -0.044  *  -0.248  **  -0.160
(0.96)  (-1.8)  (-2.29)  (-3.80)
Foreign bank dummy  -0.129  -0.461  0.390  -0.150
(-0.86)  (-2.99)  (1.25)  (-0.7)
(Time trend)*(Foreign  bank)  -0.149  -0.025  -0.362  -0.207  **
(-1.42)  (-0.65)  (-1.59)  (-2.27)
Mergers  dummy  -0.265  ***  -0.226  *  -0.207  0.292
(-2.66)  (-1.86)  (-0.6)  (1.48)
Mergers* Age  0.255  *  -0.063  0.651  0.377
-3.11  (-1.21)  (1.58)  (0.96)
Foreign M&A dummy  -0.200  0.392  -0.037  -0.010
(-2.61)  (2.61)  (-0.14)  (-0.08)
Foreign M&A*Age  0.111  -0.061  0.160  0.344
(1.01)  (-0.72)  (0.71)  (3.00)
De novo foreign entry dummy  -8.417
(-69.33)
(De novo foreign entry)*Age  -1.138
(-3.64)
Foreign purchase dummy  1.212
(8.97)
Foreign purchase*Age  0.373
(1.63)
Constant  -0.018  0.038  -2.558  3.065
(-0.05)  (0.04)  (-0.93)  (4.93)
# of observations  1388  242  302  244
Adj. R-squared  0.32  0.28  0.08  0.38
Robust t-statistics within parentheses. *  significant  at 10, 5, and  I percent, respectively.
25Table 4: Share Regressions  with Size and Foreign Interactions
Variables  Argentina  Chile  Colombia  Peru
Log of real assets  -2.276 ***  -9.287  ***  10.350  0.057
(Lagged I period)  (-5.29)  (-9.76)  (1.52)  (0.06)
(Log of real assets)2 0.080***  0.166***  -0.260  -0.014
(Lagged I period)  (5.19)  (9.58)  (-1.57)  (-0.43)
(Log of real assets)*(Foreign  bank)  2.156 ***  2.567 **  -0.496  **  -0.486
(Lagged I period)  (3.22)  (1.99)  (-2.28)  (-4.32)
(Log of real assets)  *(Foreign bank)  -0.079 ***  -0.037  0.024  **  0.034
(Lagged I period)  (-3.24)  (-1.54)  (2.28)  (4.53)
Return on assets  -0.038  -15.641  **  -5.091  22.794
(Lagged I period)  (-0.94)  (-2.3)  (-0.76)  (1.72)
Administrative  expenses/assets  0.354 **  -5.600  -8.314  *  -35.268  ***
(Lagged I period)  (2.54)  (-0.8)  (-1.79)  (-4.20)
Public bank dummy  -0.652  ***  -0.966 ***  -0.172
(-8.31)  (-9.28)  (-0.74)
Time trend  0.092  -0.068  ***  -0.151  -0.103
(1.43)  (-3.76)  (-1.24)  (-2.62)
Foreignbankdummy  -14.611  ***  -43.018**  1.004**  0.146
(-3.2)  (-2.47)  (1.96)  (0.518)
(Time trend)*(Foreign bank)  -0.192  *  -0.034  -0.504  *  -0.307
(-1.74)  (-1.07)  (-1.80)  (-3.33)
Mergers dummy  -0.142  -0.342  ***  0.243  0.408
(-1.3)  (-6.74)  (0.42)  (2.41)
Mergers* Age  0.053  0.032  1.112  *  -0.545
(0.54)  (1.26)  (1.95)  (-1.29)
Foreign M&A dummy  -0.250  **  -0.413  *  -0.504  -0.195
(-2.37)  (-1.95)  (-1.25)  (-1.06)
Foreign M&A*Age  0.152  -0.143  0.166  0.594
_______  ______  _______  _____  (1.15)  (-1.46)  (0.70)  (3.12)
De novo foreign entry dummy  -8.327  *
.__  _ _ __  - (-35.65)
(De novo foreign entry)*Age  -1.004  *
(-3.48)
Foreign purchase dummy  1.220 ***
(8.96)
Foreign purchase*Age  0.393  *
(1.67)
Constant  14.407  *  129.747  ***  -105.999  1.715
(4.86)  (9.9)  (-1.53)  (0.23)
#of observations  1388  242  302  244
Adj. R-squared  0.34  0.55  0.16  0.47
Robust t-statistics within parentheses. *  significant at  10, 5, and I percent, respectively.
26Table 5: Real Small Business Lending Growth Regressions
Variables  Argentina  Chile  Colombia  Peru
(5.1)  (5.2)  (5.3)  (5.4)  (5.5)  (5.6)  (5.7)  (5.8)
Log of real assets  0.056  ***  0.020  *  0.038  ***  -0.007  -0.039  -0.041  -0.044  **  -0.030
Lagged I  year  (5.81)  (1.73)  (3.46)  (-0.54)  (-1.00)  (-1.12)  (-2.53)  (-1.81)
(Log of real assets)*(Foreign  bank)  0.108  ***  0.061  ***  0.006  -0.061
Lagged lyear  (5.36)  (2.97)  (0.07)  (-1.49)
Return on assets  0.151  ***  0.131  **  7.658  **  8.311  **  9.315  *  9.302  **  -2.769  -4.620
Lagged] year  (2.84)  (2.42)  (2.01)  (2.2)  (2.02)  (2.02)  (-0.58)  (-0.93)
Administrative expenses/assets  0.104  *  0.098  *  0.372  -0.221  1.218  1.207  16.644  ***  15.647
Lagged lyear  (1.81)  (1.72)  (0.23)  (-0.13)  (1.37)  (1.36)  (3.55)  (3.31)
Public bank dummy  0.004  0.048  -0.192  ***  -0.135  **  -0.147  *  -0.145  *
(0.1)  (1.23)  (-2.94)  (-2.04)  (-1.90)  (-1.91)
Foreign bank dummy  -0.131  ***  -1.563  *  0.001  -1.675  ***  -0.121  *  -0.244  0.086  *  0.928
(-3.46)  (-5.61)  (0.04)  (-2.95)  (-1.71)  (-0.14)  (1.86)  (1.58)
Foreign M&A dummy  -0.037  -0.057  -0.086  -0.127  -0.131  -0.138  0.173  0.171
(-0.72)  (-1.51)  (-1.13)  (-1.6)  (-0.94)  (-0.85)  (2.69)  (2.65)
Mergers dummy  -0.206  ***  -0.188  ***  0.026  0.046  -0.066  -0.061
(-3.95)  (-4.01)  (0.38)  (0.69)  (-0.63)  (-0.62)
Foreign purchase dummy  -0.095  ***  -0.084  **
(-2.74)  (-2.53)
Constant  -0.699  ***  -0.259  *  -1.007  0.266  0.596  0.645  0.377  0.191
(-5.68)  (-1.74)  (-3.3)  (0.65)  (0.74)  (0.83)  (1.28)  (0.68)
#observations  548  548  212  212  183  183  168  168
Adj.  R-squared  0.067  0.0958  0.14  0.1657  0.0837  0.0837  0.3567  0.3627
Robust t-statistics within parentheses.  *  significant at 10,  5, and  1 percent, respectively.
27Table 6: Quality of Contracting Environment
Security of  Contract  Rule of Lawc  Creditor
Property  Enforcementb  Rightsd
Rights'
(Index of
Economic  (BERI)  (ICRG)  (LLSV)
Freedom)
Argentina  4  2.07  3.21  1
Chile  5  2.42  4.21  2
Colombia  3  1.93  1.25  0
Peru  3  1.73  1.50  0
U.K.  5  3.42  5.14  4
U.S.  5  3.54  6.00  1
a Index from 1-5, from  1997  Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. A
score of (5)  indicates that "Private property guaranteed by the government,  and efficient court system enforces
contracts.  Adequate justice system to punish those who unlawfully confiscate private property.  Expropriation not
likely"; (4) "Private property guaranteed by the government, but enforcement is lax.  Expropriation unlikely"; (3)
"Government recognizes  some private property rights,  such as land, but property can be nationalized.  Expropriation
possible"; (2) "Property Ownership is limited to personal items with little legal protection.  Communal property is
the rule.  Expropriation  likely, and government does not protect private property adequately.  The legal system has
collapsed"; (1) "Private property is outlawed.  Everything belongs to the people or the state.  Expropriation is
certain, or the country is so corrupt and chaotic that property protection is nonexistent."
b Index from  14, from Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI).  Measures the "relative degree to which
contractual agreements  are honored and complications  presented by language and mentality differences."  Higher
scores indicate greater enforceability.  Values averaged over 1980-95.  As reported  in Knack and Keefer (1995).
' Index from 1-6,  from the International  Country Risk Guide (ICRG), "reflects the degree to which the citizens of a
country are willing to accept the established  institutions  to make and implement laws and adjudicate  disputes."
Higher scores indicate "sound political institutions, and strong court system,  and provisions for an orderly
succession of power."  Lower scores indicate "a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle
claims."  Upon changes in government in countries scoring low on this measure,  new leaders "may be less likely to
accept the obligations of the previous regime." Values averaged over 1982-95.  As reported in La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997).
d Index from 04, that aggregates  various creditor rights from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998), Table  1. Index formed "by adding  I when (1) the country imposes restrictions,  such as creditors'  consent or
minimum dividends to file for reorganization;  (2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once
the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic  stay); (3)  secured creditors are ranked first in this
distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does
not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization."
28Number of banks  Number of banks
0  o  *  '  00  -o  o  - o  to  to  t  o 8w 
0  f
I  I  I  I  I  - I  I  I  I  =  H  H  (
MI
°  _~  t'
I~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~  @  I  >  '  .fo
R~~~  ~~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~  f 
Number of banks  |Number  of banks
0-o_  w  tO  *  tA  ON  x0  O-ooto'--40  Mcn<ot
IV~~~~~~~~~~ 
0  TO
. - '  .C
0  0A
L01  _  1  1  [Figure 2: Bank assets in the 1990s
Ratio of banidng sector assets to GDP:  Ratio of banking sector assets to GDP:
Argentina  Chile
57%  /




501/6-  /  60%/.
4911.o/  40%-
43%  _  20_/6
36%~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0/




32P/o  3  7.W/.%
























30%°ooo  W  .- 61
20%
10%
0%.  . . . .
0  1000  2000  3000  4000  5000  6000  7000  8000  9000
(millions of  pesos)
Domestic (non-linear +  interaction)  - Foreign  (non-linear + interaction)
Figure 4: Estimated share of lending to small businesses  by bank size for foreign and domestic banks
in Argentina at end of period.
Note: Estimated shares use coefficients  from Table 4 and are calculated  using the median values of continuous variables for banks of
that type.  Calculations are only performed for bank sizes between (approximately)  the 5d' and 95"  percentiles  for banks of  that type.
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Figure 5: Estimated share of lending to small businesses  by bank size for foreign and  domestic banks
in Chile at end of period.
Note: Estimated  shares use coefficients  from Table 4 and are calculated  using the median values of  continuous  variables for banks of
that type.  Calculations  are only performed  for bank sizes between (approximately) the 5h' and 95" percentiles  for banks of that type.
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Figure 6: Estimated share of lending to small businesses  by bank size for foreign  and domestic  banks
in Colombia at end of period.
Note:  Estimated shares  use coefficients  from Table 4 and  are calculated  using the median values of continuous variables  for banks of
that type.  Calculations  are only performed  for bank sizes between (approximately)  the 5'  and 95"t  percentiles  for banks of that type.
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Figure 7: Estimated share of lending  to small businesses  by bank size for foreign and domestic  banks
in Peru at end of period.
Note: Estimated shares  use coefficients  from Table 4 and are calculated  using the median values of continuous  variables for banks of
that type.  Calculations are only performed  for bank sizes between (approximately)  the 5" and 95"'  percentiles for banks of that type.
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Figure 8:  Estimated  growth  of lending  to  small  businesses  by bank  size  for  foreign  and domestic
banks in Argentina.
Note:  Estimated growth rates use coefficients from Table 5 and are calculated using the median values of continuous variables for
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Figure  9:  Estimated  growth  of lending  to small  businesses  by bank  size  for foreign  and  domestic
banks in Chile.
Note: Estimated growth rates use coefficients  from Table 5 and are calculated  using the median values of continuous variables for
banks of that type.  Calculations  are only performed for bank sizes between (approximately)  the 5th  and 95h percentiles for banks of
that type.
34Figure 10: Macroeconomic  conditions in Argentina, Chile, Colombia,  and Peru
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35Endnotes
I All figures on foreign control come  from IMF (2000).
2 In  2000, Chile's  ratio  of private  sector  credit to  GDP  was 66  percent.  This  figure  was  26 percent  for Peru,  23
percent for Argentina,  and 19 percent for Colombia.
3 We  also have data  on lending to borrowers with less than UF I0,000 (roughly  $300,000) and less than UF200,000
(roughly $6 million)  in total debt. Empirical results are robust to altemative definitions of small business lending.
4 In  the growth  equations,  we have  no observations  for large  foreign  banks in  Peru  because  we lose  data when
computing annual growth rates.
5 In regressions  not  report here,  we  included each  bank's market  share  and number  of branches.  These  variables
were highly collinear with  SIZE, making it difficult to interpret our results.  DeYoung et al. (1998) also find that the
number of branches is not a significant determinant of small business lending when also controlling for size.
6 Public banks in Argentina, Colombia,  and Chile account for 30, 25, and 10 percent of banking assets, respectively.
7 We have  no reason to expect that growth rates  varied systematically  over time. We compute  growth rates  relative
to small business  lending twelve months before.  This process purges the growth rates of any seasonal trend.
8  Again,  part of this stems from the short time period covered and the low number of banks, and part stems from our
inability to merge the respective country datasets  as described above.
9 The F statistics  for the tests that the coefficients on the two interaction  terms for Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia and
Peru are jointly zero are: F (2,1369)  = 13.49; F (2,227) = 90.19; F (2,287) = 2.61; and F (2,230)  = 11.46
10  The F statistics  for the  tests that the  coefficients  on the two  squared terms for Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia  and
Peru are jointly zero are: F (2,1369) = 5.26; F (2,227) = 75.90; F (2,287) = 2.61; and F (2,230) = 16.13.
"  Estimated shares are calculated for banks between the 5h and 95 h  percentile based upon size.
12  The  dummy for public ownership  remains  negative  for all three  countries  once we  include size  squared  and we
interact  both  size  measures  by  bank  origin.  However,  this  variable  becomes  statistically  insignificant  in  the
regression for Colombia.  The coefficient  on the dummy indicating  foreign ownership continues to be negative and
significant in Argentina and Chile. However,  this variable  is now positive  and significant  in the case of Colombia.
13  Since  the  growth  rates  are  calculated  based  upon  annual  growth  rates  (i.e.,  growth  over a  full  year),  data  are
omitted  for a full  year following  a merger or acquisition  to  prevent  such transactions  from affecting  results.  For
example,  a merger that doubles the size of a bank will result in abnormally  large annual  growth rates for a full year
after  a merger  even if the  merged  bank makes  no  new  loans  over this period.  Consequently,  many  observations
involving mergers and new entries  are dropped  from the analysis and several dummies are dropped from the growth
regressions  entirely.  For  example,  if a  merger  occurs  one  year  before  the  end  of the  period,  all  post-merger
information is lost from the growth regressions,  whereas  it would be included in the share regressions.
14 The interaction term and the dummy are jointly insignificant  for both Colombia and Peru (F statistics of F (2,174)
= 0.20 and F (2,161)  = 0.14).
15  The only specifications  in Table  5 that offer no such evidence are the  ones for Argentina and  Colombia that omit
the interaction term between size and foreign ownership.
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